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Abstract
Influenza viruses pose a permanent threat to human populations due to their ability to constantly
adapt to impact immunologically susceptible individuals in the forms of epidemic and pandemics
through antigenic drifts and antigenic shifts, respectively. Pandemic influenza preparedness is a
critical step in responding to future influenza outbreaks. In this regard, responding to the current
pandemic and preparing for future ones requires critical planning for the early phases where there
is no availability of pandemic vaccine with rapid deployment of medical supplies for personal
protection, antivirals, antibiotics and social distancing measures. In addition, it has become clear
that responding to the current pandemic or preparing for future ones, nation states need to
develop or strengthen their laboratory capability for influenza diagnosis as well as begin preparing
their vaccine/antiviral deployment plans. Vaccine deployment plans are the critical missing link in
pandemic preparedness and response. Rapid containment efforts are not effective and instead
mitigation efforts should lead pandemic control efforts. We suggest that development of vaccine/
antiviral deployment plans is a key preparedness step that allows nations identify logistic gaps in
their response capacity.
Introduction
"Miss M., Superintendent of Fordham Hospital, died yester-
day of pneumonia following an attack of Spanish Influenza.
The hospital is crowded with patients and short handed for
nursing help. Miss M. had worked night and day until a
week ago when she herself was stricken by the disease. Miss
M. was 28 years old..." [1]
"Mexico City, one of the world's largest cities, has closed
schools, gymnasiums, swimming pools, restaurants, and
movie theaters. Mexicans have donned masks for protection
outdoors" [2]
Pandemics and epidemics of influenza viruses represent
the most dramatic presentation of the rapid and effective
spread of viruses among immunologically vulnerable
human populations [3,4]. The rapidly evolving nature of
influenza viruses has profoundly impacted humankind
[5]. Fear and anxiety associated with influenza epidemics
flourish on uncertainty due to their often unpredictable
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course and ultimate outcome. As a result of the dynamic
and relentless evolutionary struggle between humans and
influenza viruses, effective public health interventions
demand an active adaptation and strengthening of
responses and preparedness plans [6,7].
At this moment in time, the World Health Organization
(WHO) has raised this outbreak to a category of a moder-
ately severe influenza pandemic [6]. Since the 1968 Hong
Kong pandemic, this is the first declaration of an influ-
enza pandemic in 41 years. This pandemic highlights the
perennial threat of Influenza viruses. Thus, it is critical to
apply the lessons learned from previous pandemics and
those learned up to now, from the ongoing influenza
A(H1N1)v pandemic in 2009.
Lessons learned for strengthening influenza preparedness 
and response
1) Overall preparedness plans
The first and foremost important lesson from the current
p a n d e m i c  i s  t h a t  w e  n e e d  t o  f o c u s  o u r  p l a n n i n g  a n d
response efforts on those interventions that are critical
during the early phases of a pandemic, when there is no
availability of pandemic vaccine [5]. Responding to the
current pandemic or preparing for future ones, nation
states need to develop or strengthen their laboratory
capacity for influenza diagnosis; and should begin aug-
menting their stockpiles of antivirals and antibiotics, as
well as begin preparing their vaccine/antiviral deploy-
ment plans (Figure 1).
All governments need to prepare and/or respond to the
current influenza A(H1N1)v pandemic. It is therefore cru-
cial to evaluate current response capacities: a) hospital
surge; b) pharmaceuticals; c) social distancing measures/
communications protocols; d) case management and sur-
veillance activities; e) deployment plans to move people,
medical supplies, and pharmaceuticals (vaccine, antivi-
rals, antibiotics, etc) and available syringes; f) revise
guidelines for priorization of vaccine use.
2) Improving laboratory diagnostic capacity for influenza diagnosis
Given that Mexico became the epicenter of the current
influenza epidemic, it is important to note that Mexican
authorities acted in a timely, transparent, and effective
manner to control the outbreak and notify international
public health authorities despite its limitations in labora-
tory capacity. In this regard, international collaboration
by Mexican, Canadian, and American scientists led to the
rapid identification of the influenza A(H1N1)v strain
leading to the early institution of aggressive social distanc-
ing interventions. However, this outbreak demonstrates
that need for improved laboratory capacity and the
strengthening or expansion of laboratory networks for
influenza testing to include resource-limited settings. This
is a critical policy step to achieve the early confirmation of
an outbreak with potential pandemic spread [8-10]. The
collaborative international laboratory networks that facil-
itated the identification of the current pandemic strain are
not currently in place in many regions of the world where
an influenza pandemic may erupt.
3) Considering the epidemiology of previous pandemics
By June 11, 2009, 74 nation states have cases, with
approximately 27,737 confirmed cases and 141 deaths
leading WHO to raise the outbreak to a phase 6 [4]. The
Applying lessons learned from the ongoing influenza A (H1N1) pandemic to control efforts and overall influenza pandemic pre- paredness Figure 1
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influenza A(H1N1)v strain has been associated with an
overall low transmissibility and low case-fatality rate in
Mexico (0.6%) [5]. The estimated transmissibility of the
infection (R0) ranges from 1.4 to 1.6 which is higher that
of seasonal influenza and lower than the three previous
pandemics [9]. Epidemiologic patterns in the novel influ-
enza A(H1N1)v outbreak have consistently shown the
disease taking its hardest toll on younger people [9-13]. In
the United States, 64% of the novel flu cases have
occurred in the 5- to 24-year-old age-group [14]; and in
Mexico in the group of 15 to 50. A potential explanation
for this epidemiologic distribution maybe that adults,
especially those older than 60, appear to have some cross-
antibody response to the pandemic strain [14].
While we cannot predict the events during the upcoming
2009 winter months of this pandemic, so far this pan-
demic is relatively mild in comparison to the 1918, 1957,
and the 1968 pandemics. However, in facing the current
influenza A(H1N1)v pandemic, there are epidemiologic
similarities between the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic
and the onset of the 2009 influenza A(H1N1)v that and
unavoidable and need to be considered. That said, it is
also important to recognize the significant social, cultural,
political, and scientific differences that do exist between
that period and the current worldwide order (Table 1) [5].
The major concern of this pandemic remains the case-
fatality rate seen among young Mexicans, which continues
to be largely unexplained but may potentially be attrib-
uted to an exuberant inflammatory response or interferon
antagonism among young individuals compared to those
in extremes of life, as has been suggested to have occurred
during the 1918–1919 pandemic [6]. This phenomenon
needs to be elucidated, and in this regard there are ongo-
ing efforts aimed in deciphering the underlying pathogen-
esis associated with these deaths. In addition, preliminary
clinical observations have suggested that those young
Mexicans who happened to be receiving lipid-lowering
drugs of the statins class (for other indications) during
influenza A(H1N1)v infection had better outcomes rela-
tive to those not receiving these drugs [Jose Santos-Preci-
ado, personal communication]. While we do not have
solid data to illustrate this anecdotal experience, we
believe that the potential use of anti-inflammatory drugs
in the setting of a pandemic to ameliorate the clinical
severity and improve clinical outcomes in countries with-
out enough supply of antiviral drugs or available pan-
demic vaccine merits further research [15].
4) Rapid containment strategies vs. mitigation strategies
Nowadays, with both easy access to global travel and high
population density, rapid containment of influenza epi-
demics is almost impossible to conceive [16]. Moreover,
the current 2009 influenza A(H1N1)v pandemic defi-
nitely illustrates that we cannot over-rely on the rapid
availability of a pandemic influenza vaccine (16). Most
control efforts should therefore ensure that preparedness
and response plans are in place to mitigate high levels of
morbidity and mortality; and the social and economic
disruption that can be expected during the early phases of
a pandemic.
In this sense, the WHO strategic plan for influenza is
intended to ensure that measures are in place to mitigate
the high levels of morbidity and mortality as well as the
social and economic disruption that can be expected dur-
ing the next pandemic [17,18]. A few of the relevant stra-
tegic actions contemplated by WHO have included:
strengthening the early warning system; to intensify the
rapid containment operations, building additional capac-
ity to cope with a pandemic, and coordinating global sci-
entific research and development activities [17]. It has
been proposed that within rapid containment strategies,
the main goal is to stop the development of pandemic
influenza when it is initially detected and before the virus
has been able to spread widely [19].
Despite the plans of WHO and national governments, the
current influenza A(H1N1)v demonstrates that rapid con-
tainment strategies are largely ineffective and logistically
unfeasible. The main reasons behind the lack of efficacy of
rapid containment operations are multiple. There is lim-
ited laboratory capacity in most settings of the world,
where influenza pandemics may suddenly originate such
as the case of Mexico. Additionally, there is an overall lack
of logistic planning and support to rapidly deploy vac-
cine, antivirals, and even medical supplies.
In a similar manner, only a minority of nation states have
wide availability of reserve stockpiles of antivirals, antibi-
otics, and personal protective equipment for infection
control purposes. Even deployment of antivirals from the
WHO antiviral stockpile may not arrive in affected areas
immediately after the identification of a pandemic in a
timely fashion to prevent its rapid spread. Antiviral drugs,
particularly the neuraminidase inhibitors, are most effec-
tive when given early, and must be administered early in
the clinical course if they are to truly have an impact in
shortening the time course of the disease and likely the
spread of the virus from person to person [17]. To illus-
trate this point, the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic sick-
ened more than 800 million worldwide [3,8]. Despite the
much larger current global population, a rough tally of all
stockpiles of antiviral drugs indicates there are only 250
million courses of antivirals currently available [20].
Moreover, given the insufficient stocks of antivirals in
most settings of the world, ineffective or delayed use of
antivirals in attempting rapid containment strategies may
lead to rapid development of antiviral resistance [20].
Currently, WHO is redrafting their guidelines with regard
to the most effective use of antiviral drugs. These guide-Journal of Immune Based Therapies and Vaccines 2009, 7:2 http://www.jibtherapies.com/content/7/1/2
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lines will focus on avoiding their indiscriminate use and
therefore preventing speeding the spread of neuramini-
dase inhibitor resistance which has been currently identi-
fied in many settings. In addition, these new guidelines
will likely distinguish prophylaxis vs. treatment, with an
emphasis on prophylaxis, and avoiding the use of antivi-
ral drugs for the purpose of curbing the viral spread of
influenza viruses.
History teaches the great value of non-pharmacological
interventions against influenza pandemics, and these
measures have immediate applicability [13,15]. Such
Table 1: Comparison of the 1918–1919 and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemics
1918–1919 2009
Influenza virus Avian Influenza A H1N1 Swine-Origin-Influenza A(H1N1)v
Social and political Context World War I – U.S. troops being deployed to 
Europe
One of the largest economic recessions in the 
U.S. with worldwide reach
Globalization, ease of travel, population 
overgrowth, megacities
Source of viral strain emergence Historians have suggested to potential origins 
for this pandemic viral strain in China or in the 
Midwestern US military camps during World 
War I
Unclear source, phylogeny of the virus 
demonstrates to be an Eurasian H1N1 swine 
strain
Seasonality and transmissibility Highly-transmissible – three succeeding waves 
of the outbreak
Cases surfaced in early spring in Mexico City 
and in California, U.S.A.
Initial wave spring 1918 with sustained 
multifocal transmission
Sustained transmission (two generations) only 
in North America
Affected age groups Most deaths occurred within the first six 
months of the pandemic.
Most deaths occurred within a three week time 
span.
Most affected group 15–34 year-old population Most affected group is the 5 to 30; case-fatality 
rate has ranged from 5 to 45 years of age
Case management Insufficiency of healthcare systems Wider availability of healthcare institutions
Absence of effective antimicrobials for treating 
secondary bacterial pneumonias.
Availability of broad-spectrum antimicrobials 
for treating secondary bacterial pneumonias
Medical intensive care in early phases of 
development
Sophisticated medical intensive care and 
mechanical ventilatory support
Insufficient infection control activities More established infection control activities 
and programs
Virulence Highly virulent Virulence only demonstrated as causing most 
fatalities in Mexico
Availability of vaccine No No
Susceptibility to antivirals No availability of antivirals Susceptibility to neuraminidase inhibitors 
(oseltamivir). However, there are growing 
number of resistant viral strains to oseltamivir
Nosocomial transmission Highly transmissible in hospital settings Possibility of nosocomial transmission under 
investigation with 81 healthcare workers 
affected in the U.S [23]
Molecular characterization H1N1 avian strain without evidence of 
reassortment (4)
H1N1 
(triple reassortant – human – avian – swine)
Natural history of the outbreak and 
outcomes
More than 300 million cases worldwide By June 11, 2009, 74 nation states have cases, 
with approximately 27,737 confirmed cases and 
141 death
More than 50 million people deaths worldwideJournal of Immune Based Therapies and Vaccines 2009, 7:2 http://www.jibtherapies.com/content/7/1/2
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interventions include the timely application of social dis-
tancing measures during the initial stages of an epidemic
when there is limited information on the biology of the
pandemic virus (Figure 1). More evidence-based data are
required to optimize decision-making ability of policy-
makers in terms of the efficacy of social distancing meas-
ures. However, early evidence from the Mexican outbreak
indicates that prohibiting mass gatherings was instrumen-
tal in preventing further spread of the outbreak [5].
5) Pandemic Influenza vaccine production
Current world capacity to produce influenza vaccines is
around 700 million to 900 million doses annually, which
would translate into between at least one billion to two
billion doses of monovalent influenza A(H1N1)v pan-
demic vaccine if the decision is made to switch from pro-
duction of seasonal influenza vaccine [21]. At this point in
time, the key question centers on the possibility of devel-
oping and producing a monovalent vaccine [5,22].
In this regard, it has been estimated that in 2009, seasonal
influenza vaccine production worldwide is approximately
480 million doses [22]. This number is in response to the
relatively historically low demand for manufacturing of
the vaccine. In 2006, WHO urged nation states to intro-
duce seasonal influenza vaccine into their national rou-
tine immunization plans as a public health priority or to
increase their use for those nation states with existing use
of seasonal vaccines [21]. Since then, a growing number
of nation states have stimulated vaccine demand most
likely due to the increasing recognition of the significant
burden of diseases caused by seasonal influenza in the
Northern and Southern hemispheres. Another important
issue to consider in the biology of the current influenza
A(H1N1)v strain is the potentially evolving (drifting or
shifting) nature of this agent, and therefore it is unclear at
this point whether the current vaccines will be effective
and safe.
Short term prospects for producing a larger number of
pandemic influenza vaccine doses remains limited. Fear
of a pandemic has rushed health officials and politicians
to protect their own citizens without working in coopera-
tion with other nation states in procuring pandemic influ-
enza vaccine. The rest of the world awaits a decision by the
WHO and major pharmaceutical companies [22]. Strong
international collaborative efforts are critical in this era of
globalization with regards to influenza vaccine produc-
tion efforts. Experts are advocating new vaccine adjuvants,
an intradermal route of administration to optimize
amounts of vaccine, and new vaccine production strate-
gies such as mammalian or insect cell culture to accom-
modate a larger number of influenza vaccine, as well as
the search for universal vaccines that would potentially
offer the best cross-protection against different influenza
strains [21,22]. A final consideration in regards to pan-
demic influenza vaccine policy-making is to consider the
experience of the Panamerican Health Organization
revolving fund for procuring and purchasing vaccines.
This type of international collaboration would be the next
step to have available pandemic influenza vaccines for
most areas of the world.
In the meantime, nation states should begin planning for
pandemic influenza vaccine deployment or antiviral
deployment regardless of the current absence of availabil-
ity of pandemic influenza vaccine [23-25]. The WHO
guidelines build on the premise that each Member State
has drawn up an overall influenza pandemic prepared-
ness plan that includes a deployment plan for the activi-
ties involved in delivering a pandemic influenza vaccine
(within seven days of the time it is made available to the
country). This seven-day time frame should be respected
in order to protect individuals as quickly as possible, to
reduce disease transmission and to take advantage of the
power of vaccine to fight the disease. The successful erad-
ication of smallpox and efforts to eradicate poliomyelitis
in many regions of the world have operated on this prin-
ciple (Figure 1). Furthermore, developing a deployment
plan allows the identification of human resources, medi-
cal supplies, and logistic gaps prior to the occurrence of a
large number of cases or deaths prior to a pandemic.
In summary, we should continue to learn and effectively
apply the lessons we learn from this unfortunate influ-
enza A(H1N1)v pandemic. Theultimate goal of continu-
ously improving pandemic influenza preparedness is to
identify those policy and planning structures and proc-
esses that could withstand the test of time to prepare and
respond to any potential health-focused emergency or nat-
ural disaster.
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